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ENDOCENOUS ELECTION TIMINGS AND POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES IN JAPAN
ABSTRACT
This paper constructs a theoretical model of political
business cycles in a Parliamentary system and tests predictions
and hypotheses of a theoretical model against the post-war
Japanese data. Unlike in a presidential system, the timing of a
general election is an endogenous policy variable in a
parliamentary system. Thus, one of the interesting questions in a
parliamentary system is whether elections cause business cycles
or economic expansions trigger general elections.
Empirical analyses of the post—war Japanese experience
strongly indicate that the Japanese government did not manipulate
policies in anticipation of approaching elections as political
business cycle theories in a presidential system indicate.
Instead, general elections were usually held during times of
autonomous economic expansion.In other words, the Japanese
government opportunistically manipulated the timing of elections
rather than the economy.
Takatoshi Ito




This paper constructs a theoretical model of political
business cycles in a parliamentary system and tests against the
postwar Japanese data predictions and hypotheses derived from the
theoretical model. Unlike in a presidential system, the timing of
a general election is an endogenous policy variable in a
parliamentary system. Prime Minister in Japan may dissolve the
House of Representatives anytime during its four-year term''
Thus, one of the interesting questions in a parliamentary system
is whether elections cause business cycles or economic expansions
trigger general elections.
Empirical analyses of the post-war Japanese experience
strongly indicate that the Japanese government did not manipulate
polidies in anticipation of approaching elections as political
business cycle theories in a presidential system could indicate.
Instead, general elections were usually held during times of
autonomous economic expansion.In other words, the Japanese
government opportunistically manipulated the timing of elections
rather than the economy.
Models of political business cycle theories with myopic
voters start from the underlying premise that the electorate has
preferences among economic outcomes that are reflected through
its voting behavior.Low unemployment, low inflation and high
output garner more votes for an incumbent partyo However, voters
are also presumed to be myopic: In evaluating the general state
—1—of the economy, they take into account only recent past
experiences without any future expectations.Politicians, only
interested in winning elections without much regard for the
welfare of the society, thus stimulate an economy before the
election at the cost of post-election inflation. As politicians
trytoexploit the trade-off in the short-run Phillips curve
every four years, business cycles are created.
The literature in this strand can be classified along two
lines: The traditional theory by Nordhaus (1975) and Tufte
(1978); and the partisan theory by Hibbs (1977, 1987), Beck
(1982), and Alesina and Sachs (1988).'2 According to Nordhaus,
an incumbent party generates expansions near elections and then
induces contractions to control the overheated economy after the
election. Hibbs and his followers, on the other hand, emphasizes
the partisan nature of politics.He argues that parties with
different core constituencies pursue different economic policies.
The change in parties cause the change in social priorities.
Recently, models with rational voters have been developed,
with two lines of thoughts. Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) and
Rogoff adn Sibert (1988) considered a model in which political
parties, whose objective is to maximize the probability of
staying the power, faces rational voters who rationally expect
how political parties possibly manipulates the economic policies
for elections.Alesina (1987) and Alesina and Sachs (1988)
investigated models with two parties with different social objec-
—2—tives play repeated games and test against the U.S. postwar data.
Most of these works have been conducted in the framework of
the U.S. presidential system, in which elections come once every
four years. Careful applications of the idea to other countries,
taking into account a different political system, are scarce. In
fact, in the parliamentary system like one in Japan, the timing
of elections is not fixed, but subject to a discretion of Prime
Minister. Instead of manipulating an economy in an attempt to
line up the peak of business cycles to the fixed election timing,
the incumbent party may opportunistically wait for a business
cycle peak which is generated by autonomous forces of private
sectors.
An investigation on political business cycles in Japan is
important in several aspects.\-1 First, the Parliamentary nature
of the Japanese government requires us to construct a model which
allows for endogenous election timings. Although political
business cycles in Britain, as a part of cross-country studies,
have been investigated earlier, no rigorous theoretical framework
for a parliamentary system was proposed. In section 3, I will
propose a general model which describe interaction between
election (timing) and business cycles.
Second, election timings are chosen by policy makers
depending on the course of the economy, while the policy is
conducted in expectation of elections.This implies that the
simultaneity bias becomes a problem in estimating effects of
—3-.economic performance on election timing and effects of expected
election on policy manipulation. We will empirically answer the
question whether elections cause booms or booms trigger elections
in Japan, correcting for the simultaneity bias.Inoguchi (1983)
was the first to emphasize endogeneity of election timing in
Japan. He concluded that it was more likely that the Japanese
government seized the opportunity of good economic performances
to call a general election. He attributed his finding in part to
a strong bureaucratic system independent from political
influences. Although his insight was novel, his conclusion was
not based on rigorous estimation procedures and hypothesis
testings. \
Ito and Park (1988) devised an econometric test of the
endogeneity of election timings. They investigated whether
economic variables influenced the probability of election
timings, given the time elapsed from the last election.They
found a significant effect of unexpected better performance of
the economy on the probability of election. They have also tested
whether monetary and fiscal policies were manipulated in the
expectation of electjons.They did not find an evidence that
economic policies were manipulated.
Cargifl and Hutchison (1988) also investigated whehter the
probability of elections was influenced by economic performances.
They came down to an opposite conclusion from Ito and Park: "the
incumbent party does not appear to systematically use generally
—4-.good economic conditions (or news of these conditions) in its
decisions to call elections early."In the subsequent paper,
Cargill and Hutchison (1989) examined whether the reaction
functionof monetary policy (captured by the interest rate or the
money supply) of Bank of Japan was influenced by the election
timings(dummy variable), and found that after 1975, the Bank of
Japan a systematic downward shift in the interbank rate preceding
Lower House elections. Moreover, the effect is. tempered by the
strength of the incumbent party..
The rest of this paper is. organized as follows.Next
section will make .aninformal observation at the relationship
between the growth rate and the, election timing. Section 3 will
present a theoretical. model in which the election timing is
optimally chosen by the government. An empirical analysis of the
traditional theory (effects of elections on policy manipulations)
will be carried out in section 4. A hypothesis that election
timing is endogenously chosen will be tested in section 5.
II. Casual Observations
Suppose, as uaual, that the government tries to call an
election in a quarter with good economic performances, say, the
growth rate. Then we should expect to find that the growth rate
tends to be higher in election quarters.Now recall the
Constitutional constraint that the general election has to be
called before the end gf four-year (16 quarter) term. Suppose
also that the government cannot manipulate economic performances
—5—with certainties. Under uncertainty, the government would call
an election near the end of the four-year term even if the growth
rate is only moderately high, because time may run out on the
incumbentwithout a quarter of a very high•econmic growth rate.
In sum, we expect that the probability of election tends to
increase with growth rate and to increase as the number of
quarters since last election (TSLE) increases.In other words,
an election called relatively early in the term is accompanied by
a very high economic growth rate and an election called near the
end, of the term may be accompanied by a moderately high economic
growth rate.Hence, when we plot the growth rate of each election
cycle (y-axis) against the number of quarterselapsed'(x—axis),
the end of election cycles (election timing) tend to be downward
slong
Figure 1 (1955—1972) and Figure 2 (1973—1906) show
relationship between the election timing, as a function of the
number of quarters since last election and the growth rate.
samples are divided into two periods, before and after the first
oil crisis.Samples before 1955 are not used, because the
formation of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) via merging two
parties in 1955 changed the political structure.
Insert figures 1 and 2 here
In Figure 1, the downward-sloping election threshold is
evident. Elections called between 10th and 11th quarters since
—6—last elections are accompanied by growth rates exceeding 4
percent. When the term went into the 4 year (13th quarter), the
election was called at the growth rate as low as 2 percent.
However, in each case, the growth rate of each election quarter
is higher than the preceding quarter. Moreover, the plot of
election quarters (marked by dots and quarter identifications)
show the downward-sloping property predicted in the earlier
discussion in this section.
In Figure 2, the downward-sloping property is not evident.
The first election cycle after the first oil crisis went to the
full four—year term for the first time.It is likely that the
government did not realizes that the structural change had
occurred so that the growth rate is permanently lower. The
government waited for a high growth quarter, and waited. But it
never came. In retrospect, the government should have called an
election in the 10th quarter, when the growth rate was 2.4
percent, which was much lower than the election threshold of the
pre-oil shock phase (Figure 1), but which turned out to be much
higher than the subsequent quarters. The election cycle started
in 1980:1 lasted only a half year. Clearly this was not a good
time to have an election: it was a low growth rate and too early
in the election cycle. However, this early dissolution was due
to an "accidental" passage of the nonconfidence vote on the hira
cabinet. Hence, this election cycle is an outlier from our
viewpoint of political business cycles.
—7—III. Endoqencus election tining: AnExample
In the preceding section, an observation was made that an
election was called at a lower growth rate if the number of
quarter since last electiOn was greater. In this section, I will
develop an theoretical example in which an optimal decision of
the government produces the choice of election timings with the
observed characteristics.
Suppose that the full term of House of Representatives are
four periods (years). The number of periods elapsed since last
election is denoted bys. Suppose that the economic growth rate,
is the only relevant variable for voters in the election, and
there are only three possible states with regard to g, High
growth, moderate growth, gM,and low growth gt, with an equal
probability,1/3,each.The growth rate at the time of last
election is denoted by g0
Every period, the government observes the growthrate,g5,
and decides whether to call an election.If the government
calles an election in a period with the growth rate g, the
political value of the election is the expected value of being
the power in the next election cycle. Let us denote by V(g5) the
political value of calling an election in a period with growth
rate g5. The value will be calculated later as a value functiOn
of dynamic programing problem. An electionin a high growth
periodwill make an incumbent party to win with a wide margin,
yielding the political value of h: V(g11)h.Elections in a
•Lec-2.txt . S-moderate growth rate would make an incumbent party to win with a
small margin, yielding the political value of m: V(gM)nm. iran
electionis held in a low growth period, the incumbent party is
assumed to lose a majority, and the opposition takes over a
government with a moderate margin.The fixed value, -k,
represents the agony of defeat and the discounted sum of expected
political values being as an opposition party: V(gL) =-ic.
If the incumbent party decides not to call an election, the
party extracts political utility to be in the power, b(g0, s).
The utility is a compoSite of psychic satisfaction and the
financial donation from the private sector to the party.The
utility is an increasing function of g0 since the maintaining a
wide margin gives an easy management of the govenment and the
House of Representatives. The utility is decreasing function of
s, because the returns to be in the power will deminish.
Thus, let us assume the utility of staying power in the s-
period after the election is,
s) =b1/s,s= 1,2,3: and b(gM, s) =bM/s,s= 1,2,3.
Note that the election with the low growth rate ga implies the
loss of majority. ThéreiS no b assigned for this case, since
the fixed political value of election, -k, already takes into
account the value being outside the power.
Now we are ready todescribe the dynamic probramirtg program,
sumsarizedin chart 1, which will solve the value function V(.).
etec2.txt - 9 -chart 2.
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Case1: The last election at
Suppose that the last election was held in a high growth
period. We calculate the polical value of the last election by
calculating the value backwards.
In the fourth period since the last. election (s=4), another
election must be held, so that the expected (period 3) value for
the fourth period is
5=4)h/3 +m/3-k/3=(h-I-m-k)/3.
In the third period, if an election is not held, the utility of
staying in power b/3 is earned in that period and the expect
value EV(g4, h) is also earned: the sum being (b+m+h-k)/3. If an
election is chosen, the political value of election V(.) is
earned depending on the state of economy. The election decision
is made. Let us assume, for example,
h >m>(bM+h+m-k)/3>-k. (1)
This implies that in the .third period after election1 thehigh or
moderate economic growth would trigger an election. But the low




The second period decision problem is similar: Knowing g2, the
government calls an election if V(g2) >b/2+EV(g0=gM,s=3).
The right hand side of this inequality is the sum of the value of
staying in power during the second period and the expected value
of going into the third period. Let us assume, for example,
h >(llb0+8h÷ 3m —2k)/18>n>-k (2)
Then, an election option is chosen only if high growth is
achieved in the boom in the second period.Moderate and low
growth will make the incumbent government to wait and see, while
the government enjoys commanding the power. The expected value is
then
EV(g0=g, s2) =h/3+(2/3)(lib +8h+3m-2k)/lB
=(llb+l7h+8m-2k)/27
The decision problem at the beginning of the first period is to
compare bH +EV(g0=g1s=2) with V(g1). Assume that
(38b1 +]7h+Sm—2k)/27>h (3)
Then, an election is not called even with high growth in the
first period after the last election.Therefore, the expected
value is
EV(g0=g11, s=l) =(38l+l7h+Sm—2k)/27
Now the value of V(g'1)=h is endogenously solved by equating the
value of having an election (s=O) in a high growth period is the
e(ec-2.tn 11 -expected value of this government in the future.
h =EV(g0=g,s=l)-c
=(3ab+l7h+Sm—2k)/27—c (4)
where c is the cost of election incurred by having an election.
-
case2: The last election at bM
Suppose that the last election was held at a moderate growth
period. The expected value for the fourth period is the same as
Case 1:
EV(90=qN, s=4) =h/3+m/3-k/3 (h+m-k)/3.
In the third period, if an election is not carried out, the
utility of staying in power bM/) and the expect value EV(g0=gM,
s=4) is also earned. Note that we assume b >bM. If an
election is carried out, the political value of election V(.) is
earned. Observing and comparing V(g) with (bM+h+m_k)/3, the
election decision is made. Let us assume, for example,
h >in > (bM+h+m_k)/3>—ic. (5)
This implies that in the third period after elections the high or
moderate economic growth would trigger an election, as was in
Case 1. With this decision rule being known, the expected value
is
EV(g0=gM, s=3) =(bM+4h+4m_k)/9.
In the second period, the no—election option would produce
the value bM/2 +EV(g0=gM,s=3)=(llbM+Sh+Sm-2k)/lsp.Let
us assume that
•(ec2.txt - 12 -Ii >in>(llb+8h+8m-2k)/18p>—k (6)
Then in the second period, the election is called unless growth
is in the low state. Then, the expected value is
EV(g0=gM, s=2) =h/3+m/3+(1/3)*(llbM+8h+8m_2k)/ls.
=(ll,54)bM+(13h+13m—k)/27
In the period 1, the value of no election is bM +EV(g0=gM,s=2).
Let us assume
h >(65*bM)/54+(lJh+13n—k)/27>in > —k (7)
Therefore, if growth is high, an election is called even in the
first period in Case 2 (unlike Case 1).
EV(g0=gt, s=l)h/3 +(2/3)*(65bM+26h+26m_2k)/54.
(65/81) ibM +(53h+26m—2k)/81.
Now the value of in is the expected sum of the future political
values less the election cost c:
in=(gc'ts=l) -c
(65/81) *bM +(53h+26m—2k)/81—c. (8)
Case 3: The last election at
If an election is called in the low growth period, the party
loses the majority, and the opposition party takes over as a
moderate winner.
where P is the average length of staying as an opposition party,
and bL is the per period value of being an opposition party;
bL<bM. (9)
Since P >0,(9) would be satisfied if
rtec-2.txt -13bM >0 > (9')
Solution
The political values of calling an election in high and
moderate are thus calculated endogenously and simultaneously by
equations (l to (9). The solution to the above problem is said
to exist, if we find parameter values, bH, bM, b', h, m, k, and
c, satisfying all inequalities (l)-(3), (5)-(7), and (9) and
equalities (4) and (8).
A simulation program to find such a solution can be easily
constructed by first assigning values to bH, bM, k, and c, and
second, solve from (4) and (8) for h and m. Then check whether
inequalities- (l)—(3), (5)—(7), (9') are satisfied. For example,
the following values satisfy all the conditions (l)—(8), and
(9'):
c=5, k=30, bH=20, iiLio; then (4) and (8) are solved for h and n;
h =258.373..., m —252.3413
It is easily verified that inequalities (1)—(3), (5)—(7), (9')
are satisfied.
Election decisions, solving an example of dynamic programing
problem described above, are illustrated in Figure 1.Call an
election (0) or No election (x) is indicated as a function of the
growth rate g and the elapsed time since last election s. From
this figure the following two properties in analogy of search
theoryare observed.
.tec-2.txtInsert chart 2 about here
Property 1:(Reservation growth rate property of election timing]
In period s, if an election is called for g5, then it would
also call an election for any g which is larger than g5.
Property 2:(Declining reservation growth rate property of
election timing]
If an election is called for g5 in period s, then the
election is also the choice f or g5 in period sf1.
These properties were evident in Figures 1 and 2, especially
the former. Now we have just shown that a simple theoretical
model will yield the same properties. Of course, the above
theoretical framework has a lot of simplifying assumptions.
However, it remains my conjectures that these properties will
hold in a generalized framework.It is a topic of future
research.
e(,c-2.txt - 15 -chart 2: Optimal Election Decision rule:
Assumption:
ca5, ka30, b=2O, 1inlO; then (4) and (8) are solved for h and m;
h =258.373... m =252.3413
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case 2 fl the last election was called in moderate growth period.
growth rate
realization
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o :call an election
x :Not to call an election
n(c2.tn - 16-IV. Empirical Results: Traditional Political Business Cycles
A. Popularity Punction
The first step of traditional political business cycles
theory is to find economic variables which voters are watching to
judge the competence of the incumbent party. Natural candidates
of relevant economic variables include, among others, the
economic growth rate, and the inflation rate. The unemployment
rate has been used in the U.S. study, but we do not use this
variable, since the Japanese unemployment rate has been
insensitive to business cycles. An additional dummy variable is
used to distinguish House of Representatives elections that were
held at the same time with Mouse of Councillors elections. They
were called the Dojitsu (same day] elections, or the double
elections.It has been widely believed that a Dojitsu election
helps the LDP draw its passive supporters to the polling place,
because voters recongnize a higher significance and feel a
greater satisfaction from voting, given the transaction costs to
the poll.
Now, the popularity function is specified as a percentage of
seats captured in a general election as a function of the GNP
growth rate, g, and the inflation rate, p,and the Dojitsu
dummy, D)
=a1+ a2T + baDt + b1g+b2pt + 4
wherev denotes the percentage of seats won by the incumbent
party (LDP), and T denotes the trend. Theory predicts that b1 is
elec-3.txt 17 -positive and is negative. If voters' memory for policy
evaluation is extremely short then the use of quarter—to-quarter
growth (and inflation) rate is appropriate. Cases with the one-
year, two—year and three—year memory are also examined.
Table 1 about here
Results are shown in Table 1. All signs are consistent with
priors and theory. There is a long-term decline in LDP support
and the Dojitsu election really helps the LOP gaining votes. An
influence of the GNP growth rate on votes is positive and
significant in short-memory versions up to two years and an
influence of Inflation rate on votes is always negatively and
significant. These findings are consistent with a popular thesis
of the traditional political business cycle theory (with myopic
voters).
The horizon of voters' evaluation seems to be less than two
years. Although we do not conduct a formal test of length of
memory due to a lack in the degree of freedom, it is not
inappropriate to assume that evaluation include variables in the
past year only. The finding of short memory justifies the use of
a theoretical model in the preceding section.
B. Policy manipulation
In this section we examine whether any visible changes
(beyond seasonal and demand factors) exist in monetary and fiscal
policy occurred around the election time.An idea is to test
elec-3.cxt .18whether an election would cause the government to conduct
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies.
As policy tools, we selected the money supply (M2+CD) growth
rate, and the ratios of government consumption and expenditures
to GNP. The choice of M2+CD is natural, because Bank of Japan
watches M2+CD as opposed to Ml as an important monetary aggregate
after 1975 (See Ito (1988)). The dummy variable for the regime
change will be introduced.
The government consumption or investment represents a fiscal
side of government discretion. Political favors in Japan often
take a form of bringing public projects for constituents.
Moreover, government transfers, which have been used in the
literature, are a difficult figure to obtain in Japan, since many
relevant transfers are done in the local level rather than the
central government level. The Japanese government investment
share of ON? is much higher than the United States, and it is an
important policy variable. The tax burden and transfer payments
do not adequately reflect the fiscal policy being pursued.
Hence1 only government investment (GI) and consumption
expenditures (GC) are included in our fiscal reaction functions.
The GI/GNP or GC/GNP ratio is adopted as the fiscal measure.
First, a naive approach of including an election dummy on
the right hand side will be estimated. If the election quarter
is exogenously determined and perfectly known to the monetary and:
fiscal authorities, then the use of election dummy variable is
elec-3.txc -19justified. If there is a lag between policy manipulation to the
result of an economy, then manipulation may occur in the period
preceding to the election quarter4 Hence, the election dummy,
ELEC(t) or ELEC(t-l) is used in the estimation.
However, the naive approach of using an electiondummy
would suffer from the simultaneity problem, if the (result of)
manipulation affect the election timing.The simultaneity bias
can be avoided if we use exogenous variables which would predict
the (unconditional) probability of elections.Namely, the time
(in number of quarters) elapsed since last election (TSLE) can be
used for this purpose. Alternatively, the ga post probability
distribution of post—war elections (PREL) as a function of TSLE
can be used, when voters are assumed to have a knowledge of such
a probability distribution.
(1) Monetary policy
The monetary policy is specified as follows:
!ajDj+a5REGIME+b1jm_j +b2pt_t+b3g_1+b4Et+4
wheremt is the quarterly growth rateofM2+CD money supply, t) is
a vector, (constant, trend, 2nd qtr dummy, 3rd qtr dummy, and 4th
qtr dummy); and REGIME is a dummy for regime changes described
above (1after1975:1)); '— is the annual inflation rate for
fourquarters, is,the one—year moving average of the
quarter-to-quarter CUP growth rate; and Et is a election
variable, namely ELECt, ELECt+i, TSLEt, or PRELt,and4isthe
disturbanceterm.
elec.3txt -20-Estimation results are summarized in Table 2, panel A. For
any of the four election variables, art election variable has an
insignificant coefficient.The table reveals no evidence for
manipulation of monetary or fiscal policies in expectation of
upcoming elections. It does not provide us with any support for
the traditional line of political business cycle theory.In
other words, the insignificant coefficient of the value of
election dummy, E, casts a doubt on monetary manipulation in
Japan.
Table 2 about here
(ii) Fiscal Policy
The fiscal policy in Japan has gone through a significant
regime change just as the monetary policy did.The Japanese
government pursued balanced budget principle until 1965.
Although deficit financing became legal in 1965, it was not until
the mid-l970s that the debt-GNP ratio had skyrocketed in an
attempt to combat contractions due to the first oil crisis. Yet,
the government budget share of national income remained at a
relatively low level compared to those of other countries.We
will introduce a dummy variable after the first oil crisis in
part to capture the structural change in debt policy in the mid-
1970s. The fiscal policy manipulation is specified as
2aiDs+a6OIL+'b1ft_i+b2g...1+b3Et
where t is a measure of fiscal policy: Cl/GM? or Cc/CM?; OIL is
elec'.3.txt -21-the first oil crisis dummy (1 after 1974:1); and other right—
hand-side variables are the same as the monetary manipulation
equation.
The estimation results are summarized in Table 2, panels B.
Again, there is no evidence to the hypothesis that the
probability of an upcoming election, represented by ELEC, TSLE or
PRE1, influenced the government consumption or investment.
In sum, we do not detect any influences of election
(probabilities) perceived by a function of the elapsed time since
last election on the conduct of either monetary or fiscalpolicy
in Japan.
V. Opportunistic Government Hypothesis
Section 2 and 3 provided the casual observation and a simple
theoretical model for a hypothesis that election timings are
endogenous, or, to put simply, booms trigger elections, while the
evidence in section 4 suggests us that the traditional causality
in the literature, namely election causes booms, is not detected
in Japan. In this section, we will develop an econometric test
to nest the two hypotheses in the same equation.
A. Preliminary Investigation
It is our hypothesis that an election timing depends on
economic growth, g, inflation, p, and the number of quarters
elapsed since last election, TSLE. However, due to the possible
missing variables, such as political events, the relationship
elec-3.txt -22-between an election timing and the three variables is not
deterministic.In this section, The election probability is
estimated as a function of the three variables:
PEta +b1g+ b2p + b3TSLEt +
where PEt is the probability of election; and 4isthe
distrubance term due to the missing observation, which are
assumed to be independent of economic variables and TSLE.
The estimation resuts, using LOGIT and PROBIT, are shown in
Table 3, panel A. The positive and significant coefficient on
economic growth implies that economic booms trigger an election.
An inflation tends to lower the probability of election.
Insert Table 3 about here
So far, it has been shown that economic conditions influence
the probability of election. When combined with the results in
Section 4 (that is policies are not responding to the
anticipation of elections), it shows that booms cause elections,
and not vice versa.However, it may be desirable to nest two
hypotheses in one equation.
B. Econotuetric Test
In order to clarify what I mean by a elections-cause-booms
hypothesis and a booms-trigger-elections hypothesis, the
following two hypotheses are introduced.
First, the manipulative cabinet hypothesis.The election
timings are determined in advance by (non-economic) political
elec4]txt -23reasons, which econometricians do not know. Although the length
of election cycle in a parliamentary system does vary, it works
like the presidential system if the timing is known to the
government in advance.The government manipulates the economy
through monetary and fiscal policies in an attempt to cause a
boom without inflation at the time of election.
Second, the opportunistic cabinet hypothesis. The incumbent
government does not use monetary or fiscal policy- in order to
influence the economy, just because of an election.The
incumbent waits for a timing in that some non-government, septor
shocks cause high growth and low inflation. The Japanese
incumbent cabinet has four years to grab a right moment.The
threshold of calling an election as a function of economic
performance would change as the full term approaches.
The proposed test of manipulative vs. opportunistic
government requires the econometrician to decompose growth and
inflation into policy-induced parts and non—government sector
shocks.We assume that the former is captured by the expected
component of actual growth and inflation, while the latter is
captured by the unexpected part.Each of the growth and
inflation equations is regressed on the constant, trend, money
growth (1 to 6 lags), government consumption and government
investment.(Results are not reported here. Then the fitted
values, as the effect of growth and inflation due to policy
manipulations, and residuals, as the effect of non—government
elec-3.txt -24-Footnotes
1. A general election could be called in three different
reasons. First, a general election must be held, if not earlier,
at the end of a four—year term of Lower House members. Second,
an election can be called if Prime Minister voluntarily dissolves
the Lower House.Prime Minister could find some excuses to
dissolve the Lower House if he thinks that the timing is
politically advantageous.Third, if the Lower House passes a
non-confidence resolution against the cabinet, then the Prime
Minister has to either disesolve the Lower Rouse or resign.If
the latter, the Lower House elects new Prime Minister without a
general election.
The Japanese Parliament or the Diet, which closely resembles
the British system, is divided into two houses; the Rouse of
Representatives (Lower House) and the House of Councilors (Upper
Rouse). The head of the government, Prime Minister, is elected
by the election among the member of the Lower House.
Traditionally, the head of a majority party (or a coalition of
parties) becomes Prime Minister.Also a majority of Cabinet
members are required to be selected from the Lower House.On
occasions when the two houses are in conflict, the Lower House
usually commands more power. TherEfore, the Lower House carries
more political power than the Upper House. The election of the
Lower House members, the general election, is the most important
political event.
elec-fn.txt —1—The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has dominated both houses
since its creation by merging the Liberal and Democratic parties
in 1955. The ruling party has an incentive not only to achieve
the majority but also maximize the number of seats in the House,
since the management of the House ismucheasier with a wider
margin.Therefore, although the LDP has maintained a majority
most of the time, it is reasonable to assume that the party has
pursued an objective of maximizing the seats in the House.
2. Golden and Poterba (1980) and Frey and Schneider (1978) have
estimated the so-called popularity function in order to test
whether the President's popularity depends on economic
conditions.Golden and Poterba also models how the government
uses fiscal and monetary instruments to produce political
business cycles and rejects Nordhaus' theory.Similarly,
MoCallum (1978) finds no support for the hypothesis.MacRae
(1977) enalyzes whether the electorate is myopic or not.To
examine the welfare consequences of the traditional hypothesis,
Chappell and Keech (1983) construct a complete macroeconomic
model and concludes that the six—year presidential term generally
entails less social welfare loss.
3. Japan is an excellent testing ground for the theory of
political business cycles, since the business and government are
said to enjoy much closer relationship than in the United States.
Management of business cycles (either creating one or taming one)
is presumably easier in Japan than the United States.
elec—fn.txt —2—sector shocks, from these equations are used in the probit and
logit equations of election timings. If the manipulative cabinet
hypothesis is the case, then the coefficients on the policy—
induced growth and inflation are significant; if the
opportunistic government hypothesis is correct, then the
coefficients on the non-government sector shocks are significant.
Results of this test is reported in Table 3, panel B. The
results strongly suggest that the demand and supply shocks,
independent from policy, tend to trigger elections. In
particular, there is more likely to be an election (i) when the
surprise growth rate is higher: (ii) when the surprise inflation
rate is lower; and (iii) as the number of quarters elapsedsince
last elections increases.
In sum, the Japanese government opportunistically chose the
election timings rather than manipulated the economy. This
result signals a warning against any simple—minded applications
of presidential—system models to a parliamentary system country.
6. concluding Remarks
The starting point of this research was a point that the
election timing is endogenous in a parliamentary system. A boom
may trigger an election. In this paper, how endogenous election
timings can be investigated theoretically and empirically.We
found that the Japanese government (the LDP) has chosen the
timing of elections at or near the local peak of business cycles.
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policies was not in general detected.In sum, the Japanese
government was found to be opportunistic in choosing the timing
of' election, rather than to be actively creating policy—induced
booms just for elections.
As concluding remarks, some social welfare implications may
be discussed. If a manipulation of an economy is harmful and if
the government is induced to exercize a power, the presidential
system gives a wrong incentive from the viewpoint of smoothing
business cycles. Instead, by allowing the government to choose a
timing of elections, the government's incentive to distort a
'usiness cycle is mitigated.
However, the opportunistic hypothesis, as modeled in this
paper, has a different danger. The incumbent's right to choose
election timings tend to perpetuate the popularity of the
incumbent party, other things being equal.Moreover, the
incumbent would prefer to have a business cycle more volatile
than otherwise if the voters' memory is short, and prefer to have
a shorter cycle to insure that the peak arrives within the four
years. Of course, these arguments can be denied if voters are
fully rational and capable of seeing through how much of business
cycles are policy-induced and how much are exogenous shocks.
However, constructing a model with fully rational (forward—
looking) voters ma parliamentarly sytem is out of the scope of
this paper and left for future research.
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applicability of political business cycles in Japan, claiming the
folláwing points.First, there was practically one party that
ruled the post-war Japan.The Liberal Democratic Party (LOP)
would not have an incentive to boost an economy, if they knew
that they would get a majority anyway. Second, it is well-known
that the Japanese economy had a low and inflexible unemployment
rate.Inflation rate was also very stable until the first oil
crisis.There is no way of applying the Nordhaus—type model
which relies on the Phillips curve.
The first point is not valid.Even if there was a high
probability of getting a majority, the LOP had every incentive to
pursue a maximization of seats in the House.The larger the
margin, the earsier the management of Parliament.However, the
one-party domiance basically eliminates the applicability of the
partisan theory (unless a research successfully identifies a
leftist and rightist factions withing the LDP). The second point
is valid, but it only means that we have to look for other
variables which reflect voters' concern.
4. Inoguchi (1983; chapter 5) analyzed how the policy (captured
by the change in the official discount rate) responded to
economic variables and policy variable (Table 5-5), and how the
popularity (captured by the surveyed approval ratio of the
cabinet) responded to economic and policy variables (Table 5—6).
elec—fn.txt —3—Policy decision regressions (Table 5—5) suffered from extremely
low Durbin—Watson statistics and sample—selection. Moreover, his
insight that the government does not manipulate economic policies
is not based on any econometric regressions or hypothesis
testing.This paper can be regarded as one to develop a
theoretical model and econometric tests of Inoguchi's insight.
5.Contents of this section was reported in a letter journal,
see Ito and Park (1989).
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version, 9/89 elec—rf.txt -3—Table 1: Voters Preference
Vt=a1+a2Tt+a3Dt+b1g+b2pt
Sample: t =electionquarters only, including the 1980 election.
1955:1 —1986:4,#088 =12
Const. TrendDojitsuGrowth Infl. Rbarsq DW
1. Q-mem.
coeff. 63.39—0.119.28 0.26 —0.40 0.942.01
t—stat. 26.18—6.966.72 2.19 —3.47
2. V-meat.
coeff. 64.00—0.117.42 0.42 —0.70 0.862.16
t—stat 31.88—5.123.70 2.78 —3.26
3. 21-meat.
coeff. 63.55—0.116.99 0.54 —0.74 0.841.64
t—stat 18.83—4.813.28 2.14 —2.58
4. 31-men.
coeff. 69.85—0.14 5.82 —0.06—0.48 0.721.30
t—stat 18.47—4.371.96 —0.53—1.67
Variables:
V:Percentagesof Seats won by the LDP members.
T :Trend, t





1. Q—mem. Quarter-long memory: g and p are quarter—to—quarter rates.
2. V-men. Year—long memory: g and p are changes over past 4 qtrs.
3. 21-meat. Two-year memory: g and p are changes over past 8 qtrs.
4. 31-meat. Three—year memory: g and p are changes over past 12 qtrs.
(V—men. 21—meat, and 31—men. are annualized rates.)
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mtl m 15t3 Mt4 nt-i EL a2D.w.
1.E —ELEC(t)
coeff. 0.24 -0.12 0.06 0.33 -0.07 0.02 -0.020.86 1.88




0.26 -0.13 0.06 0.33 -0.62 0.02 -0.310.86 1.89




0.24 -0.12 0.06 0.33 -0.07 0.02 0.01 0.86 1.89





0.25 -0.12 0.06 0.33 -0.07 0.02 -0.42
2.78 -1.27 0.71 3.82 -0.91 1.16 -0.32
0.86 1.89
Coefficients on a constant, the trend, the seasonal dummies, and the
monetaryregime dummy are not reported -
T: TREND -
Di: i-th quarter dummy, i —2,3,4.
REGIME: Bank of Japan, policy regime change: —I,after1975:1
m:Quarter-to-Quarter growth rate of.M2(+CD) outstanding end of qtr.
Quarter-to-Quarter growth rate of real CUP.
Quarter-to-Quarter growth rate of CPI.
EL: Election variable, Case 1 —ELECtiondummy for t (excl 1980 elec)
Case 2 —ELECtiondummy for ttl.
.
-.
Cae3 —TSLE,#ofqtrs. since last election






















B. Dependent variable —GovernmentConsumption: f —CC
CC1 g E Rbarsq DW
1. E —ELEC(t)
coef. 0.91-.82 xE-3 -.18xE-2 0.891.95
t-stat. 23.62 -1.66 -0.75
2. E —ELEC(t+1)
coeff. 0.92 -.82 xE-3 -.95xE-3 0.89 1.99
t-stat 23.80 -1.68 -0.40
3. E —TSLE(t)
coef. 0.91 -.83xE-3 -.48xE-4 0.891.95
t-st. 23.26 -1.68 -0.28
4. E —PREL(t)
coef. 0.91 -.81xE-3 -.38xE-2 0,891.96
t-stat. 23.51 -1.66 -0.48
C. Dependent variable —GovernmentInvestment: —CI
GI1 g 8 Rbarsq OW
1. E —ELEC(t)
cod. 0.96 -.66 xE-3 -.10 xE-2 0.961.97
t-stat. 35.84 -1.68 -0.52
2. E —ELEC(t+1)
coeff. 0.96 -.70xE-3-.21 xE-2 0.962.02
t-stat. 35.13 -1.23 -1.05
3. 8 —TSLE
coef. 0.97 -.69xE-3 -.11xE-3 0.96 1.97
t-stat. 35.75 -1.75 -0.80
4. 8 —PREL
coef. 0.97 -.65xE-3 -.70xE-2 0.96 1.99
t-st. 36.00 -1.67 -1.10
CC —governmentconsumption! GNP ratio, available after 1957,1
CI —governmentinvestment/ CNP ratio, available after 1957,1
TREND
Di: i-tb quarter dummy, i—2,3,4
OIL —oilcrisis dummy, —1after 1974:1
E: Election variable, Case 1 —ELECtiondummy for t(cx1980 dcc)
Case 2 —ELECtiondummy for t+l.
Case 3 —TSLE,#ofqtrs. since last election
Case 4 —PREL,fitted prob. of election as a function of ISLE.
elec—ta.txt Tables ——3—-Table 3:Ky-pothesis Testings
A. Preliminary investigation: 1957:1 -1986:4#OBS —120
PEt -a+b1g+b2p+ bsTSLE
FE —probabilityof election taking place
8 —quaxter-to-suarterfliP growth rate. (Annualized %)
p —quarter-to-quarterINFLation rate. (Annualized 1)
Const. g p ISLE Log like. —-12.18
PR03IT Avr like. —0.90
coef. -1.2.26 0.18 -0.20 0.93
t-stat -4.07 1.40 -2.17 3.61
LOGIT Log like. —-1223
cooL -21.72 0.33 -0.35 1.63 Avr like. —0.90
t-stat -3.18 2.55 -2.20 3.10
a. Hypothesis Testing: 1957:1 -1.986:4,#085 —120
PE —a+b1Eg+b2Ep+b3RESg+bsRESpt
Eg —Fittedvalues of fliP growth regressed on policy variables
ItESg —Residualsof ON? growth regressed on poLicy variables
Ep —Fittedvalues of INFLation regressed on policy variables
RESp —Residualsof INFLation regressed on policy variables
Cotst. Eg EpRES8RESpTSLE LI.. —-10.72
FROBIT Avr L —0.91
coef.-12.24 -0.00 -0.22 0.27 -0.16 1.02
t-stat-3.00 -0.19 -1.51 2.83 -1.50 3.15
LOGIT LI —-10.89
coef.-21.32 -0,00 -0.40 0.47 -0.29 1.79Avr L —0.91
t-stat-2.85 -0.01 -1.54 2.68 -1.54 2.93
Manipulative Government hypothesis: b1 ' 0
Test R: b1 —b2—0,PROM! LR test. chisq(2) —1.88 stgnif.— 0.237
LOGIT 11 test, chisq(2) —3.04 signif.— 0.219
Failing to reject H inconsistent with the Manipulative hypo.
OpportunisticGovernment hypothes is:b3b40
TestH0:b3 —b4—0,PROBIT LR test, chisq(2) —15.58signif.— 0.0004
LOGIT IR test, chisq(2) —16.27signif.— 0.0003
Rejecting H0 supports the Opportunistic gov't hypothesis.
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